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REALISM, WHAT NEXT?

II
WALTER B. KENNEDYt

I. Tr3a PROMSES OF REALISM

the process of psychoaiwdysis has spread to unaccustomed fields."'

HLIOW do judges really decide cases?

One of the most interesting

of realist jurisprudence - has been the persistent and insistent plea for a scientific study of judicial opinions: a formidable
burrowing beneath the surface of slippery sentences and "weasel words"
and a critical psychoanalysis of judicial minds. The theory back of
this new approach to the evaluation of case law seems to be that the
judges do not say what they mean or (if you prefer) do not mean what
they say; that latent in the stuff that makes for decisions is a mass
of conscious and unconscious forces which shape and control the
mental processes of the judiciary. Deep in the mental caverns are
substrata of unexpressed feelings, prejudices, compulsives and inhibitions
controlling and curbing judicial conduct. These impelling causes are
hidden from the casual reader who naively believes that judicial opinions frankly and fully express the true underlying reasons which guide
the courts in the shaping of their judgments. The realists tell us that
the scientific method of evaluating cases is to begin their study with a
skeptical mind; 3 to disregard or minimize the "vocal" behavior of the
courts which finds utterance in the reports and to delve deep into the
background of "non-vocal" behavior 5 Here, we are informed, repose the
real grounds of judicial decision and by this method alone may we be
assured of an accurate portrayal of what the courts are doing in fact and
why they are doing it.
''offshoots

t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
The present article is a continuation of Realism, What Next? (1938) 7 ForDnMIX L.
R.Ev. 203.
1. Cardozo, J., dissenting in United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 299 (1935).
2. "The most distinctive product of the last decade in the field of jurisprudence is the
rise of a group of scholars styling themselves realists and content with nothing less than

revision to its very roots of the method of judicial decision which is part of the clasAial
tradition." Cardozo, Address before New York State Bar Association, 55 Raoar O'
NEW YORK STATE BAP As-socrATniov (1932) 267.
3. Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence (1934) 7 Am. L. SCWOOL RLv. 1063; LAw Ann
rTn MODEM MrsD (1930) 17.

One condition of legal research, says Llewellyn, is "a huge and burning discontent vth
what we know.'
Llewellyn, Address before American Association of American Law
Schools (1929).
4. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 159, 161: "Why has not
our study of cases in the past yielded the results now sought? The attempt has been
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Our error seems to have been that in the past we have fallen into the
complacent belief that the law is found in the reports of the courts; that
the judges are "thinking out loud" when they issue their pretty paragraphs awarding judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant. The fact
of the matter is--so runs the critique of realism-that the formal
opinion is oftimes a legalistic cloak concealing the driving forces which
really guide judicial minds into the channel of ultimate conclusions.
And so there are two methods of valuing and of weighing judicial
decisions: One way, the easy and old fashioned way, is to scrape the
surface, to scan the printed pages of the reports, and to accept without
cavil the written say-so of the courts as an accurate, complete portrayal of the law. The other way, advocated by realist reformers, is
to search into the personal idiosyncracies of the judges, to prowl around
their family history, to look for subconscious impulses, environmental
urges, cultural compulsives, economic predilictions-and lol we come
across the real, but oft unexpressed, factors which push judicial pens and
help to spell out the true course of the law.,
Closely interlocked with the plea for a study of the personalelements of
judge-made law is the parallel proposal that legal research must step outside of the narrowing confines of the law books and view the economic,
sociological, psychological, and political situations which sway the judimade to show that this is largely due to the fact that we have focused our attention
too largely on the vocal behavior of judges in deciding cases. A study with more stress
on their non-vocal behavior, i.e., what the judges actually do when stimulated by the
facts of the case before them, is the approach indispensable to exploiting scientifically the
wealth of material in the cases. Economists may well congratulate themselves that they
have the statistical method to add objectivity to their results. The case method when
used scientifically will be found to be a method fully as significant for law as statistics
is for economics. It is outstanding as an objective method."
It seems clear that realism with its emphasis upon the shadowy, sub-vocal conduct of
the judge, is accepting, however tacitly, the psychology of behaviorism. A particularly
frank avowal of this trend in legal philosophy is found in Beutel, Some Implications of
Experimental Jurisprudence (1934) 48 HmAv. L. R.'. 169, 175. Cf. Kennedy, Principles or
Facts? (1935) 4 FoRDHA. L. Ray. 53, 69.
For articles showing the dangers of the advent of psychology of behaviorism in the
law, see Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of the Law (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 392,
355; Sayre, The Present Signification of "Mens Rea" in the Criminal Law, HARVAIW
LEGAL EssAYs (1934).

5. "If we are to gain an insight into the judicial process, we must engage in a study
of men, for, as has been observed, the judge's training, his personality, his temperament,
his courage, the spectacles through which he views life, determine his decisions." Harno,
Social Planning and Perspective Through Law (1933) 7 Am'r. L. SCHOOL Rav. 705, 710. See
Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions (1918) 6 Am. L. SCHOOL Rav. 89.
For a humorous, but pertinent, reply to the far flung emphasis upon the personality
of the judge in the evaluation of his judicial decisions, see Scott, Confessions of a Law
Teacher, Address before Association of American Law Schools, Dec. 27, 1938 reprinted in
the HANDoom OF THE AssociATioN oF AmaaxCAq LAW ScrooLs (1928) 24.
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cial minds even though these external causes are not mentioned in the
opinions of the judges. 6 Too much emphasis, say the realists, has been
paid to principles and rules which often clog and impede the search
for social background.7 To understand law in the making, and law
already made, realists insist that the scientific methods of the social
sciences and the wealth of available material in these bordering disciplines offer excellent opportunities for improving the legal order, and
more particularly, for appreciating just what the judges are doing and
why they are doing it.
Now it must be freely conceded that if realism has made out a case
against the surface value of opinions, and can prove that the "subjacent"
probe of judicial minds brings fruitful results in terms of a more accurate disclosure of the back-of-the-scenes processes at work in the judge's
study, the lawyer has been missing this verifiable technique and helpful
aid in the preparation of his cases for trial and for appeal. So also it
must be admitted that if realism is able by the use of fact-finding and
established techniques of science to give us a more accurate and complete "opinion" than the written reports, such formulas must be
adopted.
Before considering whether realism has convincingly demonstrated to
date that the probing of judicial minds has been successfully accomplished and that scientific data is available, or may be made available,'
to test out the precise meaning of judicial decisions, it may be helpful
to set down some of the claims and objectives of the new reform. The
principal tenet of legal realism is that it is real; that it deals with persons,
things, and relations as they are; that it observes and adheres to the
facts; that it abhors misleading fictions, abstractions, and the makebelieve concepts of traditional law.' Realism indorses and purports to
follow the impartial, skeptical, fact-finding and inductive experimentation of science. It insists upon breaking down lump concepts10 which
lawyers and judges use to cover multiple and diverse fact situations
and to consider each case in the light of the precise facts.
Thus realism raises the standards of unswerving and impartial search
6. Patterson, Can Law be Scientific? (1930) 25 ILL. L. REV. 121; Cook, Scientific
Method of the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303.
7. Llewelyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract (1938) 47 Ya=l L. J. 1243.
8. Oliphant, supra note 4 at 161; Harno, supra note 5, passim.
9. See extensive bibliography of writers of the realistic school in Liewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism (1931) 44 Hnv.L. REv. 1222.

10. Llewellyn is the leading and most insistent advocate of the breakdown of "lump
concepts"--a splitting up of the broad principles of law which cover all sorts of similar,
but distinguishable, situations. For a recent discuc'on of the alleged dangers of lump
concepts, see Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond (1938) 15 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 159.
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for the real facts, of maximum approach to the experimental methods
of pure science, and of a stern rejection of all abstract principles which
do not click with the definite knowable facts.
How has this meticulous adherence to the law "as is" rather than to
the law "as if" been observed in the investigation of the realists? We
may with reason expect to find that they have been most insistent that
their own studies should be divorced from possibilities and probabilities;
that they have carefully distinguished airy conjecture from verified conclusion; that they have been as skeptical in evaluating their findings of
fact as they are of the findings of law spread forth in judicial opinions.
We may likewise expect to find that realism has steered away from
the dangers of a partisan, inadequate, incomplete conclusion derived
from a few puny particulars welded together into an assumed generalization. In fine, we may expect to find that realism is real, scientific, skeptical, cautious, and critical not alone in the attack upon
traditional law but also in the building of its own substituted methods
of criticising cases and in erecting its own formulas for weighing legal
decisions.
Realism began as a protest against traditional law.11 Its followers,
however, realized that a progressive philosophy of law cannot subsist
on a negative diet of antagonism. It must offer a counter program of
its own; it must reconstruct, not merely tear down, the house of the
law. Realism is now entering upon the second and most important stage
of development. It is building a constructive program, a new approach
and technique to be used in the solution of legal problems. No longer
is the realist reformer content to attack the old order; he has a plan and
a program to be applied to particular segments of existing law. Taking
a precise question of present-day litigation the proponents of functionalism are pulling apart case law and revising it in accordance with the
pattern of realism. The experiment promises to be an interesting one
and decisive of the worth and merit of the new approach. If realism
can make good its promise of a better legal order by the use of its
formulas in action, its advance to the stage of general adoption by the
legal profession will be materially quickened. What are the results of
the use of fact-finding, of the search for the "non-vocal" behaviour of
the courts, and of the so called "scientific" method in the analysis of
an actual problem?

II.

THE PERFORMANCE OF REALISM

"[Realists] want law to deal, they themselves want to deal, with things,
with people, with tangibles and observable relations between definite
11.

Notes 4-10 supra.
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tangibles-not with words alone . . . they want to check ideas and ndcs
and formulas by facts, to keep them close to facts!'12

The most satisfactory, certainly the most practical, way to test out
the performance of realism is to view it in action; to examine an approved piece of writing13 which applies the realist technique and formula
to a concrete question of law which might pass over the desk of any
lawyer in his daily practice. Such sampling of realism in use enables
us to sense more accurately just what realists mean when they talk
about "non-vocal behavior" of the courts. It also permits us to stand
by while they disclose facts which "stimulate" the judges and influence
their opinions. Thus we may be able to evaluate the validity and
benefit of the "objective approach" and the scientific use of extra legal
data applied to an every-day legal problem.
The specific article to be examined is Price Movement and Unstated
Objections to the Defective Perfonnance of Sales Contractsby Lawrence
R. Eno in the Yale Law Journal.14 This article was selected for several reasons: (1) It deals with a definite and exact question of traditional
law and is not a mere general discussion of classical jurisprudence or an

abstract defense of the new realism. 15 (2) Eno dissects and analyzes

12. Llewellyn, loc. cit. supra note 9, at 1222.
13. The writer realizes the danger and the unfairness of attempting to prove the
weakness of realist research into facts and data by the examination of a single article
although it bears the imprimatur of realist approval. But the article selected, it is
believed, is a fair sample of the technique of realism in action. At least it offers an opportunity to point out some of the dangers which are appearing in the now developing Econd
stage of realism. It is hoped that examination of other articles in this same vein may
follow. In any event the critic of realist writing must now proceed along the road
travelled by the functional writers themselves. Each article on "bread-and-butter" problems must be separately treated and the precise topic of law covered must be carefully
analyzed. Cf. Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach (1936)
5 Fo nAms L. Ray. 272, 282-300.
One word of warning: There are, and probably always %%il be, realists of varying
degrees and theories. I have elsewhere noted this wide divergence of thought. Kennedy,
Realism, What Next? (1938) 7 FoRaDMsa L. Rnv. 203n. In the present article the writer
does not mean to imply that all realists are cast in the same mold or that they would
accept all the writings of any particular writer in the group. There are, however, certain
common tendencies which run through the new realist school such as devotion to exp2rimentalism, fact-finding, the functional approach, scientific methods and shepticism.
14. Eno, Price Movement and Unstated Objections to Defective Performance of Sales
Contracts (1935) 44 YA. L. J. 7S2 (hereafter cited: Eno).
15. The value of realism to the lawyer and judge may best be determined by the
way in which the new technique comes to grips with practical questions in the law.
Eno's article does just that. His coverage of case law is exhaustive. So far as his
principle-approach to the law is concerned, there is no ground for criticism of the leg"l
material canvassed by him. It is only when he leaves the orthodox analysis of the cares
and begins to "functionalize" and to use "scientific" data that we dissent.
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a complete line of cases which have a fairly definite meaning to the
book-lawyer and translates into these cases a substantially different
meaning when viewed through the penetrating spectacles of realistic
design.' 6 (3) The author uses the "sub-vocal" process of probing
judicial minds and offers tentative conclusions as to what the judges
were doing in marked contrast with what they were saying.1" (4) -le
pays tribute to and constantly applies extra legal material drawn from
economic sources and offers such material as factually accurate, or at
least significant, in determining the course of law as it actually is. 18
(5) The selected paper was prepared with the assistance of an authority
on the law of Sales who also has'a recognized place as a leading advocate
of realism.19
The precise question which Eno proposes to discuss in approved functional manner is a problem frequently arising in the course of the sale
of goods. S contracts to sell goods to B, the terms of the contract
specifying the amount and quality of the goods as well as the time, place
and manner of delivery. S tenders the goods ordered to B and the
latter rejects them assigning specific reasons for his rejection. Let us
say that the proffered goods are not merchantable. Thereafter S sues
B for the price and B contends that S must prove that he has satisfied
all the terms and conditions of the contract and that B may show at
16. Here is one of the distinct contributions of the new realism, Its advocates frequently begin an examination of cases at the point where the classical jurist ends. Realists

are very insistent upon background, social, economic and political.

The objective of

most lawyers is reached after an exhaustive reading of the pertinent authorities, the con-

sideration of the exact point or points involved, and the separation of dictum from decision.
Inother words, the traditional approach stresses largely the face value of current case-law.
17. See note 4, 5, supra.
18. The emphasis upon extra legal materials, gathered from social sciences and data
obtained outside of the law, is pronounced in the critiques of many realist writers. Books
have been written in criticism of the law which are practically devoid of citations or
analyses of so-called legal authorities. See, by way of extreme example, FRANX, LAW AND
THE MODER M m (1930), which purports to consider the law and yet is devoted exclusively
to non-legal materials. See also ARNoWp, Svros or GOvERN T (1935); Tnn FOLicLORE OP CAPITALISM (1937); RoasNsoN, LAW AND LAWYERS

(1935).

Eno adopts a more moderate approach and cites exhaustively case-law. He then proceeds to criticise the cases by the use of extralegal material, statistics and data derived
from other sources than the customary legal authorities consulted by the "book lawyer".
19. Eno acknowledges his debt of gratitude to Professor Karl N. Llewellyn of Columbia Law School: "Without his assistance this work would have been impossible." Eno,
supra note 14, at 782 n. The basic framework of Eno's criticism is traceable to Llewellyns
attack upon lump concepts in general and upon the broad rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw
in particular. LLEWELLYN, CA s AND MATIALs oN SALES (1930) 300. Llewellyn has
endorsed the Eno paper by the statement that it is a "lovely job". Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society (1936) 36 CoL. L. RRv. 699, 715 n. See also Llewellyn,
The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1243, 1263 n;
On Our Case-Law of Contract, Offer and Acceptance I (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 1, 26 n.
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the trial further objections constituting defective performance although
such objections were unstated at the time that B rejected the goods.
Most courts,2 0 possibly including New York,2 ' hold that a deliberate
objection by the buyer placed upon particular grounds, is deemed to be
a waiver of all other objections. Under this ruling B would not be
allowed to set up unstated objections at the time of the trial. Other
courts, under varying circumstances, permit the buyer to set up and
prove his unstated reasons for rejecting the goods. 2
Eno begins his criticism of the rule refusing to allow the buyer to
set forth his unstated objections to the seller's defective performance
of the sales contract. He starts with a consideration of Littlejohn v.
Shaw23 which, he contends, was partly responsible for the crystallization of the objectionable doctrine. In that case the buyers agreed to
accept and pay for twenty-five tons of No. 1 "cube gambier" which was
to be shipped by the sellers at Singapore for New York. The contract
contained a provision that the goods were to be of usual good quality
in merchantable condition. When the merchandise arrived in New
York City, the sellers sent a delivery order for the goods to the buyers
-who returned it with this endorsement upon it: "Rejected-not good
merchantable." When the sellers sued the buyers for failure to accept
the gambier, the buyers contended that the sellers had to prove that
they had fulfilled all the terms of the contract and not merely those
previously mentioned by the buyers when they rejected the goods. The
New York Court of Appeals, affirming a judgment below for the
sellers, said:
"But, in this case, the defendants placed their rejection of the gambier upon
two specific grounds, viz., that it was not of good merchantable quality and that
it was not in good merchantable condition. By thus formally stating their objections, they must be held to have waived all other objections. The principle
is plain, and needs no argument in support of it, that, if a particular objection
is taken to the performance and the party is silent as to all others, they are
deemed to be waived. This waiver of all other objections is not only justly
inferable, generally, but is especially so when, as under the circumstances
present in this case, the deliberateness with which the objections are stated
leaves it to be implied that there has been a consideration of the matter of
20. Eno collects cases following the majority rule at 785 n. See Wn
rxao, SAzs
(2d ed. 1924) § 495.
21. Littlejohn v. Shaw, 159 N. Y. 188, 53 N. E. 810 (1899). The broad rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw is criticised in Strasburger v. Leerburger, 233 N. Y. 55, 134 N. E. 834 (1922),
-where the court suggests that the buyer's waiver of unstated objections should be confined "to those cases where if warned the party [seller] might have obviated the trouble."
But cf. O'Meara Co. v. Nat. Park Bank of N. Y., 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636 (1925);
Woolward v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272 N. Y. 304, 5 N. E. (2d) 329 (1936).
22. Eno, at 793-800.
23. 159 N. Y. 188, 53 N. E. 810 (1899).
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acceptance of the goods and a result reached upon particular grounds. The
defendants therefore were not in a position to insist upon any other proof of
the plaintiffs to enable them to recover upon their cause of action, than that
the gambier was of good merchantable quality and in good merchantable condition."24
Before considering Eno's realistic approach to the cases involving
the problem of unstated objections, it is important to note clearly his
a priori impressions of the rule enunciated in Littlejohn v. Shaw. The
following passage indicates that he is not arguing for the complete overthrow of the Littlejohn case but is merely contending that it should be
whittled down:
"Removal of the buyer's legitimate defenses in this fashion would appear
to be justifiable only when there is present some peculiar element in the factual
situation, such as the possibility of obviating the complained of defect in
performance had timely notice thereof been given, or when there exists cause
for the belief that the buyer is endeavoring to squirm out of a contract which
he finds suddenly oppressive because of an adverse price movement. Nevertheless, the broad, formal rule enunciated in Littlejohn v. Shaw has been, and
often still is, applied blindly
to cases in which neither of these justifying ele26
ments is to be found."1
It appears, therefore, that Eno's contention is that the doctrine of
Littlejohn v. Shaw is a "lump concept", too broad to do justice, a rule
that should be restricted to cases which show (for example) the "most
important distinguishing factor" of an adverse price-drop movement
following the making of the contract. When such a price drop is present,
Eno freely admits that the buyer should be denied the right to set up
fresh obSections at the time of trial. If Eno bad confined his criticism
to the "broad formal rule" of Littlejohn v. Shaw which, he contends,
has been "applied blindly" by the courts, there would be no occasion
for the present article. A reasoned criticism of debatable principles of
the law is a healthy sign and law reviews are instituted for the purpose
of permitting writers to point out defects in existing principles of law.
Such practise has received the warm endorsement of the judiciary.2
Whether one agrees with the stated criticism of Eno or not, his opening
attack upon the rule enunciated in Littlejohn v. Shaw is ably presented.
His thorough coverage of the cases involving unstated objections sup24.

Id. at 191, 53 N. E. 810, at 811.

25. While a priori ideas are usually associated with conceptual thinking, realists also
indulge in a priori speculation about facts. The danger is that they may "see" In the facts
only data which support their preconceived ideas. MoLEY, ARE Wa MovIE MAuD.?

(1938) 34.
26.
27.

Eno, supra note 14, at 783.
Crane, Why Law School Reviews (1935) 4 FORDHAmt L. REv. 1.
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ports his contention that there is a formidable dissent to the broad
principle set down in the Littlejohn case. It must be further conceded
that the historical development of the "waiver" principle in the "money
tender" cases in England justifies his assertion that there is considerable
doubt about the soundness of the extension of such principle to the
matter of unstated objections arising in the courts of a sale of goodsP
It may even be conceded that his scholarly attack, directed to the attention of the courts, might bring about a repentant mood and result in
the overthrow of Littlejohn v. Shaw. Such eventuality has been often
known to happen, but not too often!
Realism Arrives
But Eno is not merely content to express his disagreement with the
stated rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw. At this point we may note the arrival
of realism in action.2 9 Here begins the probing of judicial minds, the
search beneath the surface of case law, the investigation of external facts
not found in the opinion of the court, and finally, the conclusion that
this collection of extra-legal material raises serious doubts about the
binding force of Littlejohn v. Shaw as a present-day precedent.
The first sentences of his article which apply the so-called realistic
approach are the following:
"But if it can be shown that the vast majority of the cases out of which this
precedent has been solidified contained factual elements which logically and
equitably distinguished them from the cases to which the broad rule is today
sought to be applied, their force as precedent is substantially destroyed. It is
the purpose of this article to demonstrate that this is indeed the fact with
respect to the rule against the setting up of unstated objections. The most
important distinguishing factor to be taken into account is that pointed out
by Llewellyn, namely, a falling market between the dosing of the deal and
the tendered delivery. As a matter of logic and equity, the presence of this
factor alone should be sufficient to account for judicial refusal to allow the
buyer to set up a trial new objections to the seller's performance. Accordingly,
the cases in which it is found should not at all be regarded as authority for
the rigid rude which wodd bar unstated objections in all circumastances!
"'
28. Eno, 783-800.
29. At this point there is noticeable a clear cut departure from the traditional approach.

Eno is now going to consider actions, not words; results, not rhetoric; what the courts
do, not what they say.
Llewellyn has expressed the true formula of realist research as follows: "It is not what
stands on the books, but what happens, which is the center of attention ... we remain
concerned primarily with what officials do and the effects of their doing." Llevwellyn,

Legal Tradition and Socid Science Method-A Realist's Critique, reprinted in Mml,
(1938) 792.
30. Italics inserted. This unusual statement by Eno indicates that his proposed attack
will disclose facts (not conjectures or assumptions) which point to the conclusion that
RrEADnzGs fr JTUSPRuDr=cE
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A consideration of the foregoing passage discloses that Eno not only
objects to the broad rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw, but he proposes to show
that the "vast majority of the cases" which have purported to follow
this precedent have contained at least one factual element (a falling
market between the closing of the sales contract and the time of delivery) which permitted the courts to rule against the buyer without
accepting the wide principle of Littlejohn v. Shaw. Eno in the quoted
passage assures the reader that he can demonstrate that such factor
of price drop was in fact present in most of the sales decisions following
Littlejohn v. Shaw, and if such be the fact, he contends that "their
force as precedent is substantially destroyed."
The first comment which an anti-realist would make to the proposed
investigation by Eno of the factual elements entering into the cases involving unstated objections is that it promises something that it cannot
perform. No.matter how cumulative and convincing his attack upon
current case law may be, it is difficult to follow Eno to his conclusion
that such proof substantially destroys the validity of Littlejohn v. Shaw
and subsequent cases as precedents. True it is that the courts might
accept his argument and adopt the restricted rule regarding unstated
objections. But it is by no means clear that the courts would do so.
The formidable hurdle of judicial acceptance of the writer's argument,
however persuasive it may be, must still be surmounted. Indeed, one
need not go beyond the four corners of Eno's article to prove that his
factual survey, however convincing, does not destroy the force of Littlejohn v. Shaw. Eno concedes that the courts have "applied blindly" the
doctrine of the Littlejohn case; 31 that there is "the tendency of many
courts to blind themselves to commercial realities in their preoccupation
with mechanical legal abstractions"; 2 that it is "unfortunate" that
in many cases they lay down the "over broad rule" of Littlejohn v.
Shaw without mention of the falling market;83 and that such absence of
4
comment regarding a price drop by the courts is "almost unforgivable".
Answering his optimistic belief that success in discovering falling market
or a price drop in the majority of the unstated-objection cases would
result in the substantial destruction of the broad principle of Littlejohn
v. Shaw, it may be suggested that the doctrine of stare decisis, however
unsatisfactory it may be to the advocates of the factual approach, is a
Littlejohn v. Shaw is of doubtful value as a precedent. He is not satisfied merely to
state that the courts were led into error by failing to consider these facts about to be

disclosed, but he is asserting that in some occult fashion these factors percolated into the
judicial mind and really influenced, although not "vocally", the decision of the courts.
31. Eno, at 783.
32. Eno, at 802 n.
33. Eno, at 811.
34. Eno, at 811.
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maxim which stands in the way. Whatever success awaits Eno's factual
analysis the first caveat filed by the anti-realists is that fact-research
or judicial psychoanalysis does not promise probable relief against the
objectionable features of Littlejohn v. Shaw. Assuming, as we have, that
the stated case calls for reconsideration and revision in terms of the
critique of Eno, his safest course will be to submit the proposed changes
to the legislature rather than to the courts.1 Certain it is that his
successful attack against Littlejohn v. Shaw may still find the courts
applying its doctrine blindly to subsequent cases in accord with the
noted tendency of many courts to adhere to "mechanical legal abstractions", rather than to consider commercial realities.
Whatever may be the ultimate results of Eno's search for the important factors of price drop or falling market in cases involving the
admission of unstated objections by the buyer in the law of sales,
Littlejohn v. Shaw and its brood of cases still remain in the law books,
cited by lawyers until the courts of last resort utter the fatal word:
overruled. It may be a matter of regret that the doctrine of stare decisis
retards the easy erasure of an objectionable rule but it is nevertheless
a fact which realists must, or should, realize."o
Probing JudicialMinds
Having set for himself the task of proving that a vast majority of
the cases involving the buyer's right to raise unstated objections contained the distinguishing factor of a price drop or a falling market, we
now turn to the proof which Eno offers of such alleged fact. For the
purposes of this paper we may accept his contention that a substantial
price drop, following the making of a contract of sale, is a factor which,
if present, right tempt the buyer to "welch" on his bargain by a delinquent notice to the seller setting up additional defects in the goods.
More: we may concede that if such factor were presented to the court,
the judges might penalize a "runaway" buyer who was endeavoring to
hide behind a smoke screen of technical objections. The concessions
are made in order to clear the way for the focal consideration: the
factual soundness and scientific accuracy of the extra-legal material
which Eno offers in proof of market collapse.
How does Eno substantiate his statements that in a "vast majority of
cases" this factor of a depressed market is present, 7 accounts for judi35. In the concluding recommendations of his paper, Eno propoZe3 a revinon of the
UNro=a SAlES Act § 49 which would broaden the right of the buyer to sAt up unstated

objections in subsequent litigation with the seller. Eno, at 817-813.
36.

CAnozo, THm NATuR- oF T= JuDicm, PRocess (1921)

149; Brandeis

in Burnet v. Coronado Coal & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932).
37. Eno, at 783.

J., dissenting
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cial refusal to aid the buyer, 38 and is of "considerable if not of paramount
importance in determining the result"? 89 The opening sentence of the
proposed formula for probing judicial minds contains a frank admission
of the difficulty which confronts him:
"When an effort is made to determine just how many of the reported cases
have contained this element of price decline as a possibly influential factor
in the mind of the court, some difficulty is presented by those decisions in
which there is no evidence40 that any drop in the market price had been brought
to the court's attention.1

It must be conceded that the writer is correct in saying that some difficulty, perhaps insuperable difficulty, arises when he attempts to establish
the presence of a price decline as a possibly influential factor in the mind
of the court when a reading of the cases discloses that there is no evidence of such drop in price or that such matter bad been brought to the
court's attention. At the very threshold of his study of "non-vocal"
behavior of the courts Eno runs into a difficulty which is inherent in
psychical investigation. He is delving into "possibilities" and conjectures; he is without factual proof.
In order to supply the missing evidence of a drop in price, Eno proceeds to make several "presuppositions". His first assumption is as
follows:
"(1) It must first of all be assumed that the court has in some way learned
of the market drop, because otherwise that lively suspicion which is so necessary to any
desire to hold the buyer to the contract would possibly not be
4
aroused."

1

This assumption is an astounding example of unscientific fact-finding.
Having set out to show that the courts in a majority of the cases were
influenced by the factor of a price drop to withhold from the buyer
the right to rely upon unstated objections, and coming across cases
38.
39.
upon
buyer

Ibid.
Observe that Eno is suggesting that this factor of price drop had a definite bearing
judicial action and may be sufficient to explain why the courts refused to allow the
to prove unstated objections at the trial. He is therefore offering his proof of
market depression as a justification of the court's action, not as a criticism of or attack
upon the courts' actual decisions. In other words his point seems to be that in a multiplicity of cases involving unstated objections the decision of the court was right, but Its
"vocal" reasoning was unsatisfactory and incomplete as an explanation of the real grounds
of the court's holding.
Here, it seems, is an example in action of Oliphant's proposal to probe judicial minds
and search for "non-vocal behavior" of the courts. See supra note 4. As I read Llewellyn,
he agrees with my interpretation of Eno's analysis of the sales cases. See Llewellyn, The
Rzde of Law in Our C~esc-Law of Contract (1938) 47 YALF L. J. 1243, 1263.
40.

Eno, at 801.

41.

Ibid. Italics inserted.
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which disclose no evidence of such factor and no indication that the
court was aware of this factor, Eno assumes that the court in some
way knew of the price recession. Instead of establishing the certainty
of judicial knowledge of a price drop, the realist conveniently assumes
the fact which he sets out to prove. It thus appears at the outset of
his investigation that Eno's paper begins with an a priori assumption
of fact not generally found in the cases and based solely upon an assumed "desire" of the judge to punish the buyer. Why not assume that
the court knew nothing about the price drop and was merely following
the doctrine of Littlejohn v. Shaw which does not require a market
recession in order to prevent the buyer from setting up unstated objec-

tions? If the courts say nothing about a price drop and there is no
evidence of such price drop in the cases, what warrant is there for
Eno's assumption that the courts may have had such price drop in
mind? The fact is that the courts in these cases which are silent as to
the market factor were merely applying the doctrine of stare decisis

to the given situation and were not only not aware of, but were not
interested in, the presence or absence of such a market depression.

Eno then follows with other "presuppositions"

-

which, he concedes,

must first be acceptable before he can weave his rope of sand connecting

the factor of price drop with the course of judicial decisions.

One

conclusion may be ventured regarding his attempt to discover the un-

expressed reasons for judicial decisions through a chain of assumptions:
such process is not scientific; it is not fact-finding; it never rises above
the level of wishful thinking, a priori belief and unverified hypothesis.
Eno makes the same concession when he says:
"All of this discussion regarding 'presuppositions' has been said to indicate
the unsubstantial character of any conclusion that may possibly be reached; to
show that the very extraction of a positive conclusion from the mass of data
42. Briefly stated, his additional assumptions are (1) that "the court realizes the
significance of the drop [in price] on the desire of the buyer to get out." He conccdea
that such assumption is dangerous in those cases which do not speciLfically say that such
price drop was the real reason for the buyer's rejection. It will later appear that moet of
the cases examined by Eno are silent on the matter of price drop as a motivating reason
for the buyer's rejection. (2) His next assumption is that the buyer may be honce-t in
making a hurried rejection on limited grounds and may not be moved by the purpose to
escape from a bad bargain. To find that the court is punishing the buyer, he concedes
that he must assume that the buyer is not honest because his whole theris rests upon
the assumption that the courts are hostile to a "welching" buyer and that therefore they
would not be antagonistic to a bona fide buyer who is acting in good faith in ranking
additional objections. Just how Eno expects to separate the honest from the dishonezt"
buyers is not disclosed by him; he simply assumes that the average buyer, faced -ith a
price drop, is moved by a desire to avoid an unfavorable bargain rather than by an honest
purpose. Eno, at 801-803.

FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

necessitates
the use of these assumptions, none of which is capable of sciontific
43
handling."

His candid admission of the unreliability of the attempted probing of
judicial minds and of the search for the sub-vocal background of the
cases involving unstated objections materially weakens his promise to
show a substantial connection between the factor of market recession
and the decisions of the courts."' It likewise destroys his concluding
inference that such connection has been established."
Recalling the emphasis of realism upon "non-vocal behavior" and the
importance of seeking out facts which sway judicial minds, it is in
order to note that Eno's attempt to relate judicial conduct to such facts
as price drop and market collapse ends in a series of "assumptions"
regarding judicial "suspicions" and "desires". Before study of judicial
behavior is seriously undertaken by the legal profession as a substitute
for the examination of judicial opinions, sterner stuff than conjectures as
to latent emotions and urges of the judiciary must be formulated.
Enter Economics
Having set for himself the task of proving that the element of market
depression was present in most of the cases ruling that the buyer cannot
introduce unstated objections, Eno now proceeds to the proof. The type
of the data to be examined introduces us to the new methods of scientific investigation approved by the school of realists. As noted above,
one of the favorite topics of realist writers is the superiority of scientific
method and its utility in dissecting legal problems. The mistake of
the law has been its failure to use the scientific approach. But they
contend that more than a change of technique is required. Vast areas
of research, explored by economists and sociologists, have been neglected
by the legal profession. This proposal ranges from the modest plea
that the law should broaden its consideration of extra legal data to the
criticism of outstanding jurists (e.g. Justices Brandeis and Cardozo)
because they decided a practical question of law without any apprecia40
tion of the ethical, economic or moral issues which might be involved.
Eno's article delves deeply into non-legal materials and statistical
economics to establish his thesis that the bulk of the cases following
43. Eno, at 803. Italics inserted.
44. See notes 37 and 38, supra.
45. See note 39, supra.
46. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 Cor.. L.
REv. 809, 812.
Cf. Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the Transcendental Approach
(1936) 5 Fommna.r L. Ray. 272, 286-295; Cohen, Correspondence (1936) 5 FORDIXAM L.
REv. 548, 549; Kennedy, More Functional Nonsense (1936) 6 FoRaDuA2X L. Rzy. 75, 83-84;
Cohen, Correspondence (1937) 6 FORDHmm L. REv. 356. See Kearney, Posthumous Piffle
(1938) 14 NoRE DAmE LAWvaa 98, 101.
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Littlejohn v. Shaw contained the concealed factor of price drop at the
time the buyers rejected the goods. It will be recalled that the majority
of the cases are silent as to such economic collapse. Proof, if such there
be, must be sought outside of the judicial records. He offers a statistical
chart (prepared in the main by Lightner and in part by other economists)
which purports to give a cross section of business conditions in America
from 1818 to 1934.1
47. The following is the teat of Eno's footnote which contains the "weather barometer"
of business in the United States (Eno, SOS n.):
"In considering the cases, the following weather barometer of American busdne history from 1818 will be used. The form of the chart and most of the information was
derived from Oro C. LIcEao =, HISTORY OF BusNEsS DrRSSos (1922). The other
information was gathered from Itwuas Fisanm, Boomrs &,;D Drnsxo:.s (1932) and
ARrTart
B. AD A=s, T =amor Busmn-ss, 1922-32 (1932)."
1818-Threatening
1853-Fair
188--Fair
1819-Hurricane
1354-Fair
1889-Threatcning
1820-Gale
1855-Fair
1890--Storm
1821-Clearing
1856-Fair
1S91-Fair
1822-Fair
1857-Tornado
IS92-Fair
1823-Fair
1858-Clearing
1893-Storm
1324-Fair
1859-Fair
1894-Stormy
1825-Storm
1860-Storm
19f--Continued Stormy
1326-Fair
1861-Stormy
196-Clearing
1827-Fair
162-Fair
I897-Fair
1S28--Squall
1863-Fair
189--Fair
1S29-Fair
1864-Fair
1899-Fair
1830-Fair
1865--Fair
190--Fair
1S31-Fair
1866-Fair
1901-Fair
1832-Fair
1867-Fair
1902-Fair
1833-Partly Cloudy
1868--Threatening
1903-Squall
1834-Fair
1869-Black Friday
1904-Fair
1835--Fair
1870-Fair
1905--Fair
183 6-Threatening
1871-Fair
1905-Fair
1837-Hurricane
1872-Fair
1907--Cyclone
183---Stormy
1873-Cyclone
1903-Clearing
1839-Continued Stormy
1874-High Winds
1909-Fair
1840-Clearing
187-Clearing
1910-Fair
I841-Fair
1876-Fair
1911-Fair
1842-Fair
1877-Fair
1912-Fair
1843-Fair
1878-Storm
Il9 3 -Partly Cloudy
1844-Fair
1879--Clearing
l914-Storm
1845--Fair
18S0-Fair
1915--Partly Cloudy
146-Fair
1882-Fair
1916-Fair
1847-Storm
1883-Partly Cloudy
1917-Fair
1848-Storm
184-Storm
1918--Fair
1849-Fair
1885--Fair
1919-Fair
1850-Fair
186-Fair
1920-Partly Cloudy
192
1851-Squall
1887-Fair
1-Stormy
1852-Fair
1922-Stormy
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"Weather Barometer" of Prices
Before examining the use which Eno makes of the business chart it
is necessary-and all realists would so concede--to consider the basic
soundness of the statistical material; its factual content as distinguished
from mere opinion; and its relevancy in situations not contemplated by
the chart-maker. Such preliminary survey indicates that the chart
deals not with measurable activities of natural science but with the flux
and change of human action which cannot be graphed with mathematical
certainty. Each economist is prone to interpret the elusive facts which
make up "business activity" according to his emphasis upon the various
factors.4 8 Again, the stated summary of business conditions was not
prepared to disclose whether a delinquent buyer was trying to escape
from a bad bargain because the market price had dropped after the
contract of sale was made. Lightner's "barometer" was prepared to show
the general trend in business in connection with his historical study of
business depressions.4 9 We turn to the chart forewarned that it will
reveal opinion and not facts and that it is being used for a purpose
not contemplated by the originators.
It is submitted that the "weather barometer" which Eno offers as
an index of annual business conditions in America (1) is unreliable and
demonstrably inaccurate; and (2) provides insufficient data with which
to determine the existence or non-existence of a price drop in the sales
cases cited by him.
(1) The Inaccuracy of the "Weather Barometer".
Several shortcomings may be noted in the Lightner-Eno chart which
purports to give a cross section of the state of business in the United
States during each year from 1818 to 1934. The stated weather barometer is merely a lump-estimate of vacillating conditions of business
based upon incomplete data 0 and subject to external factors unknown
1931-Stormy
1927-Fair
1923-Fair
1932-Stormy
1928-Threatening
1924-Fair
1933-Stormy
1929-Hurricane
1925-Fair
1934-Stormy
1930-Hurricane
1926-Fair
48. See notes 50-53, infra.
49. LiGmTNER, HISTORY OF BUsiNEss DasRSSIONS (1922) 123. It is significant that
Lightner did not accompany his "weather barometer" with an explanation of the sources
from which he derived his annual symbols of business conditions; nor does he explain
the process by which he obtained the average business condition.
50. Lightner goes back to the year 1818 to begin his chart of annual business conditions. The inadequacy of the business data available in the early years is nowhere mentioned. One would assume that the entire span of commercial activity from 1818 to 1934
may be measured by available statistics of the same quality and quantity. The history
of the recordation of business changes discloses that such equality of treatment is not
possible. Indeed since the World War national and state governments, as well as private
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and unknowable to the chart-maker."1 It is in other words, based upon
opinion 52 and not upon facts and is subject to all the controversy and
dispute which come out of the clashing theories of economists. 3 This
does not mean or imply that such economic statistics are without worth
but it does mean that the findings are contingent upon the counterinterpretations of other experts and are merely hypotheses rather than
proven facts.
The following discrepancies are visible in the attempt to compress
into a single page the full sweep of American industry from 1818 to 1934:
(a) The weather barometer uses the calendar year as the time
unit to express the prevalent business status during the given year. But
booms and depressions know not the calendar and start and stop without
regard for the season or month. To attempt, therefore, to squeeze under
one symbol a variant flux of market movements and to use one index
figure for three hundred and sixty-five days is a curious example of
lump-fact thinking.'M Economists concede that safety requires that the
time index of business activities should be reduced to quarterly, or
better still, monthly figures in order to reduce the chance of error. 5
(b) A concrete example indicates the unreliability of the calendar
year as the time span for Eno's weather barometer. Sad to recall, a
business cataclysm engulfed the country in the Fall of 1929. Turning
back to the business chart it is noted that Eno symbolizes the business
agencies, have expanded their activities in the gathering and compiling of statistics on
industrial and business activities. The result has been a corresponding improvement In
the accuracy of the assembled data. ADnuSs, A,,YsEs or Bustr.ss Cycrs (1936) 62;
Slichter, The Period 1919-1936 in the United States: Its Significance for Eminess Cycle
Theory (1937) 19 RLrvw or Eco-noe STATscs 4.
51. Adams lists three economic factors or forces for which adequate data are not
available: (1) precise volume of retail trade from month to month; (2) changes in the
prices of real estate, securities, professional services and labor; and (3) lack of statistical
facts interpreting the results of a particular statistical series in relation to facts deduced
from other statistical series. Adams, op. cit. supra note 50, at 62-63.

52. The Harvard Committee on Research in Trade Cycles has appointed a sub-committea to study the problem "of the degree, to which statistical verification may be
secured to support or negative existing theories of the business cycle." Slichter, op. cit.
supra, note 50.

Observe the cautious words of Slichter in studying the course of the busineE. cycle
of 1919-1936.

While more ample statistical data was available to Slichter than Lightner

possessed, Slichter warns that "even the data for this period leaves much to be desired2' Ibid.
53. Lightner points out that some economists claim that we had busines depre-ions
in the years 1867, 1882 and 1900. But he reassuringly offers the "most authoritative statistics" and their "unfailing truth" to prove that there were no depressions in the stated
years l LrGnnz,
op. cit. supra note 49, at 81.
54. See pp. 73-75, infra.
55. Adams, op. cit. supra note 50, at 60.
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of the year 1929 by the single word "hurricane". But when did the
"hurricane" of 1929 arrive? So far as the memory of the man on the
7
street goes, supported by expert " and official figures,5 the business
hurricane of 1929 did not sweep over the country until September.
Remarkable to recall, it followed eight months of unparalleled business
prosperity culminating in the zephyr-like announcement of the Department of Commerce to the effect that "on the basis of early figures
business activity in August [1929] was higher than in any other similar
period on record". 58 From January to August 1929, check payments,
steel output, activity in the automobile industry and car loadings were
mounting to new highs. 9 True, the "hurricane" arrived in 1929, but
the use of the single term "hurricane" to symbolize a business collapse
which was mainly confined to the last four months of 1929 is factually
inaccurate and capable of gross misinterpretation in the subsequent use
of such data. 0 A similar criticism may be made of other annual desig01 The fact
nations of business status set down in Eno's business chart.
of the matter is that the exact time when a depression starts or ends
cannot be accurately timed.6 2 The undercurrent of causes is so deep
and impenetrable that economists are unable to agree even after the
56. See Chart I-Index of Industrial Production; Chart II-Index of Debits of Individual Accounts; Chart XIII-Index of Business Trends, reproduced in ADMAs, op. cit.
supra note 50, Appendix. The foregoing indices show that the first eight months of 1929
were marked by increases in industrial production and debits to individual accounts and
by a rising trend in business.
57. SURVEY OF CURRENT BusrNEss (United States Department of Commerce) Nos. 9098 (Feb. to Oct., 1929.)
SURVEY OF CURRENT BusINEss (United States Department of Commerce) No. 97
58.
(September 1929) p. 1.
59. See note 57, supra.
60. This very danger of drawing particular conclusions from "lump-fact" generalizations
is present in Eno's use of the "weather barometer" for purposes not contemplated by or
known to the economist preparing such statistical material. See pp. 64-70, infra.
61. For example, (1) Lightner's chart, which has been adopted and accepted by Eno
without appreciable qualification, lists the year 1837 as a "hurricane" year. Yet Lightner
shows that the real panic in that year began on May 10, 1837 when the banks of New
York City decided to suspend specie demands. Lightner, op. cit. supra note 49, at p. 127.
(2) Eno lists 1922 as "stormy", while Adams says: "Employment and payroll conditions
began to improve in February 1922 and retail trade definitely increased in volume after
April 1922. By 1922, recovery from the depression was an accomplished fact so far as
production, trade, employment, prices and consumption were concerned. In other words,
there was recovery in business (profit-making conditions); but there still remained underlying problems of maladjustments, such as the bad conditions in the agricultural industry,
and the 'frozen' debts." AnAms, op. cit. supra note 50, at 80. (3) Eno lists 1928 as
"threatening", while the Index of Business Trends shows a net rise in index figures from
130 to 150 between January and December 1928. Anaxs, op. cit. supra note 50, Appendix, 277.
62. ADAuS, op. cit. supra note 90, at 69
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event as to the precise status of business at a certain period in our
history. This is due to the scarcity of statistical data and to the presence
of such external elements as seasonal variations and secular trends.
The best that can be said about the chart of business is that it is a
rough approximation of annual conditions, an "average " 03 or a composite
picture which does not reveal, and was not intended to reveal, the possible up and down trends within the year-unit.
(c) Lightner's weather barometer of business aims to show the condition of trade in all industries under a single caption for each year.
Thus the chart lists all business as "fair" or "stormy" or "threatening",
etc. It is clear that such compact table does not, and cannot, reveal
the condition of business in any particdarindustry or trade except on
the false assumption that all industrial and business activities rise and
fall at the same time and in the same degree.' It is evident that the
yearly symbol used by Lightner merely presents a summary of general
business conditions in the given year. Certain it is that any attempt to
use the data collected to establish the range of prices in a particilar

industry at a definite time is unscientific and exceeds the scope and
utility of his chart.
Concluding the preliminary examination of the "weather barometer"
it appears that such table of business conditions does not reveal facts
but merely possibilities.6" It is a summary of many clashing factors
some of them uncertain and dubious, woven into a tentative index and
63. This of course is obvious. The very purpose of a statistical chart indexing busi.s
conditions during a given period of time is to give the average status rather than to record
fluctuations within the period. AD.%_rs, op. cit. supra note 50, at 65.
64. For an interesting study of the varying effects of a depression on the price of different kinds of goods see ADn-;rs, op. cit. supra note 50, at 152. He points out that prices
of raw materials and capital equipment decline faster than the prices of finished consumers' goods; that retail prices do not decline as rapidly as wholesale prices. It is not
unusual for the prices of certain commodities to be falling while other commodities are
rising in price. Suravw or Cuaarr Busmrss No. S9 (U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Jan.
1929) p. 5.
The courts have taken judicial notice of the fact that the depression began in 1929 and did
not appreciably affect real estate and mortgage values until late in 1931 or early in 1932.
Corn Exchange Bank v. Ekenberg, 161 M1isc. 62, 292 N. Y. Supp. 142 (1936); see Matter
of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 226, 269 N. Y. Supp. 470 (1934). After the stock marhet
crashed in 1929 investors turned from stock to guaranteed mortgage certificates and one
New York company sold more guaranteed mortgages in 1930-1931 than ever before. Sea
Matter of Balie, 152 M11isc. 739, 743, 274 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1934).
I am indebted to Milton R. Friedman of the New York Bar for the latter cases in Noew
York which show very strikingly that depressions do not affect all commercial activities In
the same degree or at the same time.
65. "Possibilities are not facts. The prudent man cannot act wvisly in the light of mere

possibilities. He must have something more definite to go on. He must have some sort of
knowledge about the relative facts." MoLEY, Arx WE MovrE L%-? (193S) 55.
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subject to all the vagaries of economic theory. So long as we deal with
such statistics with these limitations in mind, so long as we do not veer
from may be to is in evaluating the hypothetical assumptions of such
data,6 6 some benefit may be derived from the collected material. Our
next line of inquiry will be to ascertain what use Eno makes of these
simplified symbols depicting the state of business in the United States
from 1818 to 1934.
(2) Eno's Use of the "Weather Barometer".
The most interesting and provocative part of Eno's contribution is
his extensive acceptance and uncritical adoption of the weather barometer and its second-hand use to settle the legal problems arising out of
Littlejohn v. Shaw and the cases following the latter holding. 7 Recall

that Eno has promised to prove that the vast majority of cases since
Littlejohn v. Shaw were decided during periods of business depression;
that this economic factor influenced the buyer to squirm out of his
contract; that the courts were possibly aware of the market depression;
and that a probable reason for refusing to allow the buyer to set up

his unstated objections was the courts' unwillingness to permit the buyer
to escape from the contract in these circumstances. 8 The cases, with
few exceptions, are silent as to the general collapse of business or as to
a drop in the price of a specific commodity." Therefore Eno must
66. Professors Michael and Adler have performed a real service in pointing out that
a priori ideas of a scientist are apt to lead him from a modest assertion that his data may
support his ideas to a dogmatic conclusion that his fragmentary findings do substantiate
his preconceived assumption. MICHAEL AND ADLER, CRI.ME, LAW AN SocxAL SciENc, (1933)
passim; ADLER, ART AND PRUDENCE (1937) passim. See also MOLEY, op. cit. supra note
65, at 34.
67. Patterson, defending the use of the scientific approach in the law, criticises the lack
of adequate investigation of social and economic facts by the judges. He says: "The
judges' experiences are limited and their methods of collecting data are likely to be that
of casual observation. Moreover, the 'facts change'; the facts of a prior decision are often
warmed-over facts." Patterson, Can Law Be Scientific? (1930) 25 ILL. L, Rv. 121, 140.
It strikes the observer of realism in action that a similar use of "warmed-over facts,"
gathered by social scientists for other purposes, is frequently visible in the writings
of the new modernists.
68. See notes 37, 38, 39 supra.
69. Until realism arrived the examination of a case or line of cases by the legal profession was restricted to the points actually presented, argued and decided. Unless the point
was openly litigated, it was not thought to be involved in the decision even though the
point was in fact present.
The Supreme Court has said: "Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither
lbrought to the attention of the court or ruled upon, are not to be considered as having
been so decided as to constitute precedent." Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1924),
cited by Loughran, J., dissenting in Matter of Schinasi, 277 N. Y. 252, 269, 14 N. r.
(2d) 58, 64 (1938).
But the new realist technique raises to the surface facts not directed to the attention
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establish this fact, if at all, by extraneous evidence not found in the
records of the cases. How does he bridge the chasm between case law
and economic statistics?
Let us trace out his technique. He first collects all the cases from
1818 to 1934 which involve the problem of unstated objections and which
decide that the buyer cannot supplement his original objections by
fresh objections later made. Next he finds the year (regardless of the
exact month) when the buyer rejected the goods. Lacking evidence
in the case itself indicating the condition of the market in that commodity at the time of the buyer's rejection, he turns to the weather
barometer and sets down the given symbol which classifies the business
weather for the specific year. If he finds that the buyer's refusal to
take the goods, occurred at any time within a year when the weather
chart indicated "stormy" or "threatening" or "unsettled" commercial
weather he concludes that such case contains the possible factor of a
price drop and that this trade recession probably is one reason why the
court resisted the buyer's attempt to add unstated objections in order
to escape from an unfavorable bargain.
Perhaps a few concrete examples, taken out of Eno's analysis of the
sales cases, may show the inadequacy and unreliability of accepting a
of the court or ruled upon, or even mentioned in the court's opinion. More startling is the

effort to inject new facts into the cases following the examination of extra-legal data obtained from sources far removed from the testimony. Having discovered the new facts
by an independent investigation the realist does not hesitate to assume that the courts
knew about these newly discovered facts and perhaps based their decisions upon them.
One cannot refrain from wondering what is going to happen to the good old maxim,
de wniniris non curat lex, if the fact-fishing expedition of the modernists is actually ued
in the preparation of briefs and the analysis of cases. The technique of the brief 'writer
will be: Not to find out what a judge said but what he d'd; not to determine v;hat the
judge did about the facts, but what the facts did to the judge; not to discover the facts
which were presented to the court, but to rediscover facts which were not presented.
But more than that: if law is to a considerable extent weighted and -hap:d by personalized factors of behavior, desire, etc. (notes 4, 5, 29, 30, 39 Supra), then law bccomes
highly personal; it ceases to be largely impersonal. What then? If frank mention %-ere
made of these judicial predilections and urges extracted by realism out of past cases, the
main issue might become the conduct of the judges rather than the conduct of the litigants,
raising a nice question of res inter alios ata. But more embarrassing still would be the
candid use of the behavior-approach as applied to the judge sitting in the p.nding controversy. Here at least, I know, realists would not insist that their "az-is" analysis of
judicial behavior be interwoven into the trial or appellate brief inzofar as the fitting judges
were involved. In such a situation, even realists would probably revert to "word magie"
of traditional law to put across the hidden psychic forces at work; law would again bzcome,
externally at least, impersonal.
All of which amounts to this: the entry of personal law (colored vith bhaviorism)
raises some knotty tactical as well as psychological questions. In the traditional era it was
simple enough to argue with any judge (present or absent) as to what he thought the law
was. More delicate is the task of realism in informing the judge why he thinis it.
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ready made "weather barometer" and applying it to the specific purpose
of determining a price drop in the unstated objection cases canvassed
by the writer.
His case material is divisible into two parts:
(1) Those cases which decide against the buyer and mention in
varying degrees of clarity the economic factor of a price drop or a falling market.
(2) Those cases which do not mention the factor of price drop or
market recession in the course of the court's opinion or statement of
the facts.
(1) Cases Mentioning Economic Recession: It is not without significance that Eno finds few cases7" which even mention that the buyer
breached his contract at a time when prices were descending or market
conditions were unfavorable. Why did the courts omit all mention of
the economic factors which Eno deems most important? A fair assumption would seem to be that the courts' omission of reference to falling
prices was due to the fact that the rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw, so widely
adopted by the courts, does not recognize such factor as essential in
the denial to the buyer of a right to set up unstated objections. The
buyer is barred from enlarging the grounds upon which he rejected the
goods, whether the market is stable or shaky, whether prices are up or
down, whenever he places his original refusal to accept the goods upon
particular grounds and later tries to enlarge these objections by the
statement of fresh defects at the time of trial. Let us recall the pertinent language of the basic decision of Littlejohn v. Shaw:
"The principle is plain, and needs no argument in support of it, that, if
a particular objection is taken to the performance,
and the party is silent
71
as to all others, they are deemed to be waived."
Surely the statement of this broad principle, not limited to times of
depressed prices, sufficiently accounts for the paucity of judicial decisions mentioning the economic factors of price recession or falling
market.
Moreover, Eno's analysis of the few cases, which in some degree
mention a prevalent mark down of prices, offers scant support for his
contention that price drop is an "important" factor which whittles down
the broad rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw and confines it to situations where
we have "run away" buyers who are trying to escape from unfavorable
bargains.72 While the cases are few in number in which the courts say
70. Eno quotes from ten cases which, to some extent, expressly set down the factor of
price drop or depressed market in the course of the statement of facts or Judicial opinion.
See infra note 72.
71. Littlejohn v. Shaw, 159 N. Y. 188, 191, 53 N. E. 810, 811 (1899).
72. Eno divides his case material into three classes: (1) Cases decided before Littlejohn
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that they are aware of the falling market and that therefore the buyer
ought to stand by his bad bargain, it is somewhat strange to find that
Eno dwells at some length upon this fragmentary list of cases. Let it
be recalled that realism stresses judicial behavior and tends to minimize
the face value of judicial utterances. We have been informed that more
emphasis should be given to non-vocal law. This line of cleavage is
abandoned by Eno when he comes across infrequent vocal pronouncements of the courts which support his thesis. 5 It seems that some
v. Shaw; (2) cases decided after Littlejohn v. Shaw and before Ginn v. Clark, 143 M1ich.
84, 106 N. W. 867 (19G6); and (3) cases decided subsequent to Ginn v. Clark.
Comparatively few cases are discovered by Eno before or after Littlejohn v. Shaw
which expressly mention the factor of price decline or market depression.
Before Littlejohn v. Shaw, he mentions two cases which specifically state that there
was a drop in the market. Donner v. Thompson, 6 Hill 203, 212 (N. Y. 1843); Hayden
v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426 (1873). It is of interest to note that in neither one of the-e
cases does the court expressly rest its decision upon such price drop.
Between the "base-line" decisions of Littlejohn v. Shaw and Ginn v. Clark, Eno Ends
four cases which contain facts more or less vaguely indicating that the buyer's alleged
breach took place in time of business stress or after a drop in the price of the s-pacific
commodity. Peterson v. Mineral King Fruit Co., 140 Cal. 624, 74 Pac. 162 (1903); Olcc:2
v. Mobile Fruit & Trading Co., 112 IM. App. 281 (1904); Druchlieb v. Univeesal Tobacco
Co., 106 App. Div. 470, 94 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1st Dep't 1905). It is noteworthy that
even though the price factor is in some degree mentioned by the courts in the above case3,
the courts in question do not rely upon the depressed market as a reason for deciding
against the buyer. Eno states that it is "unfortunate" that the courts did not realize
the importance of this factor. (Eno, at 807). If the courts ignore the alleged significance
of the price drop in cases where such evidence is brought to the attention of the court,
his stated purpose of proving that such price recesion is a motivating factor in cascs
where the courts do not mention it at all seems to be a formidable task.
After Ginn v. Clark, Eno cites four cases where there is evidence of a price drop and
some language in the opinions indicative that this factor seems to be regarded as material
by the judges. Daniels v. Morris, 65 Ore. 289, 130 Pac. 397 (1913); Fielding v. Robertson, 141 Va. 123, 126 S. E. 231 (1925); Armsby Co. v. Raymond Broz.-Clarke Co., g0
Neb. 553, 134 N. W. 174 (1912); Lowinson v. Newman, 201 App. Div. 266, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 253 (1st Dep't 1922) (see Eno, at 310-S11). Following such citations, Eno mentions
other cases where the drop in the market is so pronounced that the failure of the court
to mention such factor as a real reason for rejection is "almost unforgivable". One extreme
case involves a price drop from 23 40 to 61¢ per pound and yet no reliance on such
price recession is made by the court. Colonial Ice Cream Co. v. Interocean Mercantile
Corp., 296 Fed. 316 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924).
Answering Eno's contention that the failure of the courts to mention price recc:son i3
"unfortunate" or "unforgivable", the explanation of such omion seems to be fairly
obvious. The courts were adhering to the broad doctrine enunciated by Littlejohn v.
Shaw, and were not interested in the non-essential factors of price drop or market collapse. Summing up the few cases which expresly mention the unfavorable market prevailing at the time of the sales contracts in question, it seems that Eno can derive !cant
comfort from the manner in which the courts curtly dismiss the economic factors of price
or market.
73. Eno confines the case-quotations in his text to the few cases in which mention
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realists are not averse to stress judicial language provided only that the
judicial language is in accord with their views. One final comment on
the cases which mentions the factor of price drop or market collapse:
The followers of the traditional approach readily concede that insofar
as a court mentions, and really relies upon such economic factors, no
quarrel is possible with a commentator's plausible conclusion that such
judicial statement may properly be considered as an indication of the
court's recognition of such economic factors as possible conditions
qualifying the otherwise broad rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw. All we insist
upon is that an absence of such factors in the courts' opinions argues
for their unimportance in the present stage of case-law.
(2) Cases Not Mentioning Economic Recession: The danger of the
acceptance of statistics without careful examination of the source and
reliability of the data, and without adequate consideration of the limited
purpose for which they were collected, is clearly visible when we weigh
Eno's conclusions regarding the cases which are silent as to a price
drop or market collapse. Basing his conclusion almost exclusively upon
the skeletonized weather chart prepared principally by Lightner, Eno
claims that two-thirds of all the cases involving unstated objections by
buyer "reveal a generally depressed market or a price drop in the specific commodity."' 4 A reexamination of the weather barometer, accepted
by Eno as an accurate index of business "weather" prevailing when
the sales cases in question were before the courts, discloses some fatal
defects in such summation.
Passing the aforementioned shortcomings of Lightner's ambitious attempt to squeeze into a single page the fluctuations of American business
during this century and more of complex mercantile movements, 0 the
following additional objections may be made to lump statistics utilized
to describe exact market conditions prevailing in sixty-five sales cases
decided at irregular intervals during one hundred years.
(1) The weather chart upon which Eno relies uses the year as a
time-unit to depict the average business trend within that annual period.
Eno erroneously assumes that such yearly symbol correctly discloses
the prevailing "trade winds" at all times during the given calendar year. 0
is made of the price drop by the courts (Eno, at 804, 810, 811, 815, 816).

Despite the fact

that the vast majority of the cases say nothing about price drop and that many of them
contain language unqualifiedly applying the rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw, such judicial
language is not mentioned. In other words, Eno seems to press down very hard on vocal
law when it fits his thesis, but ignores it when it does not.
74. Eno, at 817.
75. See pp. 60-63, supra.

76. An examination of Eno's classification of the sales cases indicates that he consld.
ered only the year when a buyer rejected the goods; no mention is made of the month
when such rejection took place. Obviously there may be a wide variance in business
conditions between January and December of a given year. See notes 56-59 supra.
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(2) Lightner's barometer does nothing more than to sum up the
general business status without any attempt to classify the state of
business in different industries. Eno infers erroneously that such general data may be used to indicate the price and market variations in
any particularcommodity. 77
(3) Eno cfoes not consider the possibility that a rise in prices may
take place even during a period of depression but concludes that all
prices continue downward in all commodities throughout the entire
period of unsettled business.
(4) He does not take into account seasonal spurts in particular
commodities which are possible and probable even while the general
business condition may be subnormal. When such occasional upswing
occurs, a stiffening of or increase in price is a factor which temporarily
retards the descending cycle of prices.
(5) While Eno concedes7 that the business conditions prevailing
at the time of sales litigation may have a greater effect in influencing the
court's decision than the business situation obtaining at the time of the
alleged breach of the buyer's contract, his statistics and summary are
seemingly based solely upon the price range in existence at the time of
the breach. 9
(6) At least eleven of the cases,"0 which he argues reveal a price
drop either in the particular product contracted for or in the general
77. Lightner's chart is used by Eno in his attempt to discover the prezence of a price
drop in the cases involving unstated objections by the buyer. Occasionally he refers to
government statistics relating to a particular industry. See note 64 supra.
78. Eno, at 802 n.
79. While Eno lists the business conditions prevailing in each case at the time of the decision, as well as the business conditions at the time of the breach, his constant emphasis fs
upon the business conditions in existence "at the time of the breach." Cf. Eno, at C05, 812,
315.
80. Bank of America v. Whitney Central Nat. Bank, 291 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923);
Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v. Meridian Wholesale Co., 289 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923);
Erie Food Products Corp. v. Interocean Mercantile Corp., 299 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924);
Garda & Maggini Co. v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., 294 Fed. 765, 76S (C. C.
A. 9th, 1924); Bank of Taiwan v. Union Nat. Bank of Philadelphia, 1 F. (2d) 65 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1924); National Importing & Trading Co. v. Bear & Co., 236 Il1. App. 426
(1925); Memhard v. Gabrielsen Co., 224 Ky. 238, 5 S. W. (2d) 1070 (1923); Harvard
Co. v. Himmelein, 226 Mich. 691, 193 N. W. 207 (1924); Miller v. Ungerer & Co., 183
App. Div. 655, 176 N. Y. Supp. 850 (2d Dep't, 1919); Carson Petroleum Co. v. Balboa
Trading Co., 120 Misc. 389, 198 N. Y. Supp. 556 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Fielding v. Robrtson,
141 Va. 123, 126 S. E. 231 (1925).
It is true that an analysis of some of the above cases may dclose some evdence of a
price drop. My point here is that Lightner's symbol, "partly cloudy," does not necezzarily
disclose such factor and should not be alone relied on to establish such proof. If space
permitted, it is submitted that a similar criticism could be made of other smbotls appearing in Lightner's chart, e.g., "threatening," "squall," etc. Such terms are vague and general
and are nowhere defined by Lightner or Eno.
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market, were decided during business weather which Lightner lists as
"partly cloudy". Such vague term may mean anything. "Partly cloudy"
weather may symbolize normal business in some lines of goods, and
subnormal business activity in other lines; it may mean that business
is good in some sections of the country, and not so good in other sections; it may mean that there is some slight threat of impending storms
in the commercial world which have not yet sufficiently materialized
to affect prices at all. Neither Lightner, nor Eno, offers a word of
explanation as to the precise meaning of the term or the causal connection between such type of "weather" and falling prices. Despite the
pronounced ambiguity of such symbol, Eno apparently lists all cases
involving a buyer's refusal to accept delivery during a year listed as
"partly cloudy" as cases showing a price drop."
(7) Ten of the eleven cases" showing breaches of contract during
"partly cloudy" weather involved breaches during the year 1920.8"
There is considerable doubt whether such label is accurate as an expression of business conditions prevailing during the entire year. Adams
would doubtless contend that the true designation for 1920 should be
"fair" from January to July, followed by "threatening" weather.8 4
Whether Lightner or Adams is correct, it is not necessary now to decide,
if such decision is possible; 8 it suffices to point out that the commercial
symbol of "partly cloudy" weather in 1920 is itself partly cloudyl And
all deductions from such elusive symbol must be similarly shadowy
and uncertain.
Considering the unreliability and uncertainty of the statistical data
collected for purposes far removed from the exact objectives sought by
Eno, and noting the above mentioned defects in his uncritical use of
such material to establish the presence of a price drop or a depressed
market in sales cases which are silent as to such factors, it is submitted that his conclusion that such factors are present in two-thirds
of the cases examined has not been established by adequate or satisfactory proof.8 6
81. This statement is based upon Eno's summary wherein he claims that forty-four
cases canvassed by him "contained the factor of depression." Eno, at 817 n. The count of
the present writer would indicate that all cases decided in "partly cloudy" weather were
included by Eno in the list of cases containing the factor of depression.
82. See note 80 supra.
83. With the exception of Miller v. Ungerer & Co., 188 App. Div. 655, 176 N. Y. Supp.
850 (2d Dep't, 1919), the cases cited in note 80 supra were cases in which the alleged
breach of the sales contract by the buyer occurred during 1920.
84. Adams, op. cit. supra note 50, at 61, 65. See also Index of department-store sales;
Index of wholesale commodity prices; Index of loans of banks; Index of business trends;
Table I--construction contracts awarded. Id. Appendix.
85. See notes 49-53 supra.
86. Note the assertion of Eno that as a result of his factual analysis of price drop and
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The selection of Eno's article for extended analysis was due to the
fact that it bore the imprimatur of realists' approval 7 and applied the
formulas, technique and philosophy of legal realism to a concrete problem
of everyday law. He purported to examine facts not found in the
cases; he attempted to "observe" judicial behavior and to record the
"impact of facts" upon judicial decisions; he accepted economic statistics at their face value and used them in the analysis of case law; he
looked beneath the surface of judicial opinions and criticised verbal
rules by means of his newly discovered facts.
The experiment does not appear to be successful. The so-called
"facts" garnered from economic data and statistics are demonstrably
conjectures of doubtful value. Even though he succeeded in proving
the presence of facts not mentioned in the opinions of the courts, his
attempt to observe judicial behavior and to discover how far the
courts reacted to such facts is a failure. Indeed he frankly concedes that
his attempt to psychoanalyze judicial minds never rises above the level
of "presuppositions" as to the possible course of judicial thinking.
The two main objectives of Eno's paper, we believe, stand unproved:
(1) He does not show that a vast majority of the cases before or after
Littlejohi v. Shaw actually contain the factor of price drop or a falling
market; and (2) he does not show that such factor of economic depression (even if present) had any appreciable effect in impelling the
courts to refuse to the buyer the right to rely on unstated objections at
the time of the trial.
Before concluding the study of realism applied by Eno to a precise
question of the law of sales, it should be again stated that the alleged
failure of accomplishment is not traceable to lack of research on his
part. On the contrary the genuine tribute paid to his work in so far
as it proceeded along the traditional lines of legal research is restated.89
The criticism, whatever its worth, centers solely around his attempt to
invoke the realist approach and to leave the path of the law in his
analysis of the stated problem. It is believed that he did the best that he
its presence in two-thirds of all cases examined, he believes that it is justifiable to say
that the precedent of Littlejohn v. Shaw is cut down to situations wherein the price drop
is shown to be present (Eno, at 317). Such conclusion, even a-uming that be has
proved the price drop factor to be in the background at the time of the court's decdsion!,
is a non sequilur (see pp. 53-55, supra). In view of his alleged failure to cstabli-h the
presence of a price drop, his conclusion regarding the partial overthrow of Littlejohn v.
Shaw becomes doubly objectionable.
The course of Eno's argument, moving from a series of "presuppositions" as to judicial
conduct (Eno, at 801-803) to a tentative conclusion that the "courts should pay no heed
to seeming precedent" (Eno, at S17), fails to convince an anti-realist that his "presuppozitions" have been proved or that precedent has been undermined.
87. See note 19, supra.
S8. See pp. 52-53, supra.
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could with the materials available. Whatever failure is visible is traceable not to the worker, but to the inadequate tools in his workshop.
The science of psychology did not, and could not, give him a reliable
technique that would enable him to probe into judicial minds and fathom
the subconscious forces there at work in the formulation of courts' decisions. The data of economics provided no materials which could give
him an accurate picture of the fluctuating prices in specific commodities
at the particular time when buyers rejected goods tendered by their
sellers.
III.

Somia DEFECTS OF APPLIED REALISm

"Good thinking, the thinking of a competent scientist or philosopher, must
not be wishful .... The premises used must be chosen and accepted, not
because they prove a conclusion we desire to believe, but because by the
criteria of evidence they are sound and true in fact." 9
Llewellyn good-naturedly refers to the harmless realist pastime of
hurling verbal volleys at "top hats" in the shape of antique rules and
principles; he promises, and makes good his promise, to ask in a gentlemanly manner for their removal and examination." I trust that the same
privilege of bowling over an occasional "top hat" adorning realistic
heads will be accorded to the critic of realism without the inference
that our attack is directed against realist headgear in general. But
because of the variant and multicolored types of juristic millinery bearing the label of realism,9 the critic is never quite sure whether he is
directing his fire against "top hats" or tam-o-shantersl Therefore, if an
occasional shot falls into the wrong yard because of poor aim or because
of confusion of headgear, the writer must apologize in advance when
realism, like the hapless husband, is misunderstood. Such misunderstanding will be due in part, we believe, to the overlapping left, center,
and right groups-all claiming the same privilege to "go formal" and
to wear the top hat and tails of Realism. More about this diversity of
realistic doctrine as we proceed with our examination.
Using the Eno article as a basis for discussion, it may be possible
to extract out of his application of realist theories some constructive
suggestions which may be of value to the advocates of the functional
or realist approach in the law. Some of the defects of Realism, perhaps
many of them, are curable: minor ailments which may be likened to
the growing pains of youth, temporary disorders which will pass away
when the full stature of a developed and applied philosophy of law is
89. ADLER, WHAT MAN HAS MADE OF MAN (1937) 63.
90. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract (1938) 47 YALE L.
1243, 1271 n.
91. Kennedy, Realism, What Next? (1938) 7 FORDnAM L. REv. 203.

J.
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establishedV2 Other shortcomings, it is feared, call at least for compromise, change of emphasis, and modification of the violent assault
upon the old legal order which marks the barrage of the outriders in
the realist ranks.
Lump Concepts vcrsts Lump Facts
The realists warn: Beware of lump concepts; of word charms which
are powerless to sense the social facts; of pseudo rules which miss the
economic issues; of static standards which are blind to the pressure of
ever changing facts. Concepts are what concepts do; the test of the
validity of a principle is the observation of the results of the principle in
action. Break down the lump concepts and thereby achieve a real rather
than a make-believe certainty in the law. So runs the critique against
lump concepts.
The reader of the attack against concepts confesses that he is somewhat confused about the breadth of the opposition; he does not know
just how far realism aims to go in its ouster of broad rules and principles.
A study of the writings of Arnold,"3 Frank," Sturges, 5 and Moore,""
for example, leaves the perplexed traditionalist with the impression that
they contest the validity, permanency, and utility of all concepts, rules,
or principles. Opportunism and anarchistic individualism run riot
through their pages; "the cult of the single decision" correctly stamps
the output of writers we have elsewhere called sur-realists. Observe
the argument which proposes nothing less than the wholesale removal
of the "lump concepts" of Corporation, Contract, Title, Property, and
others. 7 The adherent to rule or principle finds no common ground for
compromise when faced with a legal philosophy of chaos and chance.
Suffice it to say that such extreme antagonism to rules and principles
merely attempts to translate into the law and into government 3 the
tenets of a philosophy 92 which refuses to recognize that there are any
92. I have attempted to show the youth-element of realism in my article Prin,7pes
or Facts? (1935) 4 FoRD-= L. Rr. 53, 56.
93. ArieoLD, THE SY ooL or Govrmnrsn (1935); THE FOLIaa or" CrrAac
(1937).
94. FRANx, LAW AxD TH MOD=I
ID (1930).
95. Sturges and Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property Mor gages (1928) 37 YALE
L. J. 691. See also Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism (1931) 44 HAUAmv
L. Rv.
1222, 1241 n.
96. Mloore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions (1923) 23 CoL. L. R-v. 609; Legal and

Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts (1932) 40 YAr

L. J.

381, 555, 752, 928.

97. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 COL L.
Rnv. 809, 820-321.
9S. Arnold, Government, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 30, 1938, sec. XI, p. 17, col. 1.
99. Lippman, The Modern .M1alady,N. Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 3, 1938, p. 21, col. 2:
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fundamental truths or that there is any basic distinction between the
good and the bad, the true and the false. Meeting the issue engendered
by such extreme opposition to legal concepts solely on a pragmatic
basis, it is asserted that the complete abandonment of principles would
spell the end of the legal order. It has been elsewhere noted that Russia
experimented with this ouster of law in the form of a broadside attack
against legal dogmas without complete success.1 00 True it is that
principles and concepts cani be carried too far. But this overemphasis
provides no valid reason for lifting them out of the law in their
entirety.1 0 '
It is not asserted or believed that all realists hold that concepts and
rules are without purpose or utility in the legal order. More moderate
criticism of "lump concepts" is visible in the writings of Llewellyn °2
and Patterson."' Llewellyn repeatedly warns against distorting his
criticism of pseudo rules into a bombardment of Rules or Concepts at
large.'
He freely concedes that rules and principles are a necessary
part of the legal order. But the time has arrived to issue a warning
even to the middle-of-the-road realists who are busily at work on pseudo
rules and moribund concepts. Attention is directed to the prevalent
error of realism in attempting to undermine lump concepts by spurious
assortments of lump facts.
By "lump facts" we mean a conglomerate pile of data, statistics, and
facts (untested and unverified) welded together into a loose generalization and offered in the name of science to contest the validity of a legal
formula or doctrine. Despite the rigid insistence that realism aims to
portray things as is it is suspected that the advocates of fact-finding
have "seen" facts which were not present and have fixed their gaze so
steadily upon the desired result (the ouster or change of existing rules
of law) that they are suffering from an optical delusion productive of
juristic astigmatism. "Wishful thinking" so often associated with conceptual adherents, is not wholly absent from the reformers' search
for facts and functions. At this point it is well to recall that the eye
as well as the mind may err; a "fact" does not become such merely
"The modem man has persuaded himself that nothing is really true, and that all truths

are just the convenient opinions of a class or of a nation at a particular moment,

nut

this disbelief in the existence of a central tradition of human wisdom is the philosophy
of the spiritual proletariat."
100. Gsovski, The Soviet Concept of Law (1938) 7 FoRDMm
L. Rv. 1.
101. Kennedy, Pragmatisin as a Philosophy of Law (1925) 9 MARQUETIr L. Rv, 64, 71.
102. Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium (1931) 31 COL. L. REV.
82, 84.
103. Patterson, op. cit. supra note 67; See Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 90g,at 1271 n.
104. Lleweflyn, The Rule of Law in our Case-Law of Contract (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
1243, 1269.
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because it issues forth from an economist's study or a psychological
laboratory.
To go back to the Eno article for an example of "lump fact" thinking,
we have it in his uncritical use of the statistical data prepared by
Lightner purporting to set down accurately the business conditions of
America from 1818 to 1934.21° Such "lumping" of economic facts is
inaccurate in its original setting and doubly dangerous when translated
into the law of sales. Another instance of lump-fact thinking is found
in Cohen's article, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach,"" wherein he attempts to overthrow the legal concepts in
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.' r and United Mine Workers of Amcrica
v. Coronado Coal Co. °s by refusing to "see" facts expressly set down
in the courts' opinions. Lump-fact thinking arrives when he argues for
the redefinition of legal concepts in terms of "such positive [sic]
sciences as economics and psychology! "119
Doubtless the deficiency of lump-fact thinking is temporary and may
be removed in part when the realists appreciate that skepticism should
dominate the consideration of facts as well as their analysis of legal
principles."0 Facts are nimble things even when viewed through the
microscope of realism; and the critic merely asks that realists apply
the same scientific exactitude in analyzing their facts which uniformly
characterizes their lack of faith in legal concepts. Skepticism, no less
than the charitable urge, should begin at home-and realism may fairly
be said to be "at home" with facts.
The Law Visits Science
Let us be more specific in criticizing the boundless faith of realism
105.
106.

See pp. 64-70, supra.
Cohen, op. cit. supra note 97, at 809-814.

107. 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
108.

259 U. S. 344 (1922).

109. Id. at 821. For a critique of Cohen's ouster of concepts, cee my articles, op. dt.
supra note 46.
110. A vibrant skepticism, argues Frank, marks the experiments of the new movement

in the law. His faith is limited to a faith in the validity of facts, functions, and dezires,
and to a recognition that rules, reason, and judgment play a small part in human affairs.
[Frank, Modern Trends in Jurispndence (1934) 7 AIL L. SCROOL REV. 1063]. Llewellyn
more moderately insists that his faith in facts in no wise impairs his interest in better law.
[Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv.
159, 161-162]. The difficulty which confuses the onlooker is the contrast between the

unbelief of realism in the face value of opinions of the courts and in the rules set down
therein, and the realists' belief and ready acceptance of factual data, statistics, charts, and
graphs without adequate weighing or evaluation. Such criticism takes full cognizance
of the importance of facts but demands that these facts be real and not "p-eudo"; that
they be sprayed with the same "cynical add" which is used to cleanse and purify legal
concepts. [Cohen, op. cit. supra note 97, at 840].
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in pseudo facts and the consequent danger of over-emphasis of pseudo
rules. To make fruitful their attack upon "the prevailing doctrinal
formulation of precise rule and guiding principle," realists must understand the importance of their initial step: convincing proof that the
scalpel and forceps of science are digging and probing for (and finding)
real facts. Then, and only then, can they weigh their facts against
current rules and principles for the purpose of showing the need for
doctrinal reformation. A finer fact-filtering process must be developed
in order to satisfy the conservative lawyer that realism offers any appreciable advantage over the case law scheme of things with its background
of principles, rules, and standards. So we suggest, that a long period
of experimentation must first be conducted lest we run the danger of
overthrowing "lump concepts" by "lump facts" which have not been
adequately distilled.
If this lack of adequate "cooking" of functions and facts were the
result merely of "recipes" necessarily experimental and tentative in the
formative steps of a new school of jurisprudence, one might postpone
the further criticism of the manhandling of extra-legal material and
conclude with the moderate suggestion that the "raw data" of the social
sciences be subjected to a prolonged period of aging in the realists'
laboratory before their use in juristic refectories. But a fundamental
difference of viewpoint has grown up between realism and its opponents
on the question of the basic skill and training required to utilize accurately extra-legal material in relation to the problems of law under
investigation.
The issue may be clearly defined. Realists demand the integration
of social and economic facts into the legal order"'-the infiltration of
psychology,"' economics," 8 and sociology"14 (not to mention physics, 115
mathematics,"' and anthropology) .11 We are not now concerned with
the value of such extra-legal data but merely with the method of acquiring such information and doing it in a satisfactory and scientific manner. Quite a sizeable task for any jurist, law professor, or lawyer to
undertakel What degree of skill and proficiency must the legal realist
acquire in these bordering disciplines in order to use such non-legal
material intelligently and wisely in the improvement of current rules
and principles? Llewellyn answers:
111.

Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education (1935)

REv. 651, 671.
112. RonINsoN, LAW AND THE LAWYvRs

(1935) passim. See note 4 supra.

113. Beutel, op. cit. supra note 4.
114. Angell, The Value of Sociology to Law (1933)
supra note 5.
115.

RUErF, FRo0

116.

Cohen, op. cit. supra note 97, at 825.
CAIRNS, LAW A=D THE SocIAL, SCCFs (1935).

117.

35 COL. L.

31 Mic.

L. Rzv. 512; Harno,

THE PHYSICAL TO ME SOCIAL SCiaiCES (1929); Cohen,

supra note 97,
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REALISM, WHAT NEXT? II

"The instructor has first of all to conquer inertia. It is hard to plough
new ground, and one needs to plough around the field before he knows its
nature and its possibilities. The instructor has, second, to keep his balance.
I agree in toto with Goodrich's cautioning: The social sciences harbor both
school-exaggeration and a lunatic fringe; nor can a man master (in one sense)
many disciplines. Yet there is a chasm of difference between such "mastery" as
means first-rate standing as a worker in neighboring ploughland, and such
modest 'mastery' as means only the ability to read critically, and to evaluate
the findings read and the methods out of which they came. Only this last
is called for. It is enough to rejog thinking, and to awaken appetite. True,
shifting vocabulary solves no legal problems; but the concepts a new vocabulary
adds, and the information which comes packaged in those concepts, may raise
or clarify dozens of legal problems at a time.""us
A similar optimism regarding the absorption of scientific knowledge
is visible in the writings of Robinson,' Oliphant, 120 Rueff,' - ' Patterson, 22 and BeutelY- The proposal to widen the frontiers of the law
by a leisurely excursion into the realms of psychology, economics, sociology, and neighboring fields demands some consideration. It has been
wisely said that "as the diameter of our knowledge increases so also
does the circumference of our ignorance." 2 As Llewellyn concedes,
such an expansion is "a gigantic task,"'2 and a task, I submit, which
is not accomplished merely by a "modest mastery" and critical reading.
To qualify the legalist to read critically and evaluate findings, something
more is required. Unless the lawyer is able to weigh the competing
theories, let us say of psychology or economics, he will be unable to
reach a sound decision as to the best theory to be utilized as a "background" for the legal order. True it is that the social sciences "harbor
both school-exaggeration and a lunatic fringe.'"O How, we ask, will
modest mastery suffice to spot a scholastic "hobby horse" or academic
abnormality? How much more skill is required to spot a War Admiral
(out of Science) and groom him for the Legal Sweepstakes! A thorough knowledge of all competitive and clashing theories must first be
acquired lest the aforementioned danger of "lump fact" thinking reappear in the translation of social sciences into the law.
113.

Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 111, at 671 n.
RoBrxqso.,T, op. cit. supra note 112.
120. Oliphant, op. cit. supa note 4.
119.

121.

Ruxer, op. cit. supra note 115.

122. Patterson, Can Law Be Scientific? (1930) 25 Imr. L. RE,. 121.
123. Beutel, op. cit. supra note 4.
124. Wilkinson, The Lawyer and the Defense of Constitutional Derncracy in America
(1933) 7 Fonnmzz L. Rzv. 301.
125. Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 111, at 672.
126. For a warning of the danger of "school-exaggerationl, seee PsCeor.eCns or 1925.
Preface.
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Take an example: Professor Robinson insisted that "all of its [the
law's] fundamental concepts will have to be brought into line with
psychological knowledge."'2 7 Very well. How is this overhauling job
to be undertaken? What is "psychological knowledge"? Read the
contradictory psychological holdings of Watson, Hunter, Woodworth,
Koffka, Kohler, Prince, McDougall, Dunlap, and Bentley,1 28 and we
may sense the stupendous task of reconciling, evaluating, and deciding
the correct theories to be lifted out of psychology and used as a background for legal reform. No, a modest mastery seemingly will not
suffice; the law cannot safely build in a background of the social sciences
until it thoroughly masters foreground as well. Dealing only with the
methods of expanding legal research into bordering disciplines, the
realists must avoid the danger of a short cut which may cut short the
efficacy of the proposed excursion into extra-legal areas. To so counsel
is not to maintain a defeatist attitude or to argue that such excursion
should not be attempted but merely to suggest that the realist's proposal "to plough around the field" does not satisfy; he must also plant,
cultivate, and harvest the crop of scientific data before such products
can be safely stored in the legal warehouse. Otherwise the consumption
of lump facts-no less than of lump concepts-may bring about legal
indigestion.
127. ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 112, at v.
128. The contrasted views of the above mentioned psychologists will be found in
PSYcHOLOGIES OF 1925. One need not go beyond the pages of a single authoritative
work on psychology to realize the utter confusion and antagonism of psychological theories,
Schools divide into warring groups. Behaviorists form not one, but many, schools;
dynamic psychology does not typify one trend of psychological thought but is a term
of varied meanings. This is indeed an "era of psychologies."

Our objective, at this moment, is not to consider whether such clashing and controversial theories offer any promise to the law, but merely to point out that the utility of
psychology can only be determined after an exhaustive analysis of the comvetitive theories
and their evaluation.
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